Taxes and quality: A market-level analysis�
Jennifer S. James and Julian M. Alston*

A conventional assumption of product homogeneity when the commodity of interest is
actually heterogeneous will lead to errors in an analysis of the incidence of policies, such
as taxes. In this article, an equilibrium displacement model is used to derive analytical
solutions for price, quantity, and quality eﬀects of ad valorem and per unit taxes. The
results show how parameters determine the eﬀects of tax policies on quality. The
potential for tax-induced distortions in quality, and the distributive consequences of
those distortions, are illustrated in a case study of the market for Australian wine.

1. Introduction
When conducting policy analyses, economists often use a model of an
homogeneous good. However, commodities are increasingly heterogeneous
and policy eﬀects are likely to diﬀer among various qualities of a particular
commodity. An homogeneous-good model will fail to account for the
diﬀerent eﬀects, and for policy-induced changes in the distribution of quality
(or average quality). This article introduces a useful approach to modelling
quality and applies it to formally link quality changes to tax policies, with a
view to increasing our understanding of how policies inﬂuence quality at the
market level.
Quality variation is incorporated in an equilibrium displacement model
in which the commodity of interest is available in two qualities. This
representation simpliﬁes the nature of heterogeneity of most agricultural
�
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commodities, but two qualities are suﬃcient to demonstrate how quality
responds to various policies, while keeping the model as simple as possible.
The model is used to show the theoretical price, quantity, and quality eﬀects of
ad valorem and per-unit tax policies in a closed economy. Analytical
expressions for the errors from assuming product homogeneity are derived
under the assumption that the high- and low-quality goods of interest comprise
a weakly separable group. Solutions from this analytical model show which
parameters play a key role in determining quality responses, and when these
quality responses may be important components of policy outcomes.
The potential importance of quality responses to tax policies is illustrated
with an application to Australian wine. When the goods and services tax
(GST) was introduced in 2000, the existing ad valorem wholesale taxes on
wine were to be replaced with a wholesale tax that, when combined with the
10 per cent GST, would be tax revenue neutral. Policy decisions included the
size of the revenue-neutral tax, as well as how the tax should be speciﬁed – on
a per unit or ad valorem basis. Based on intuition about individual
behaviour, a per unit tax would be expected to increase the incentive to
produce high-quality wine, relative to lower-quality cask wines. This paper
derives theoretical results that show the conditions under which this
argument is (and is not) valid at the market level, and presents results from
empirical analysis in a stylised model of the Australian wine market. The
numerical analysis demonstrates the potential empirical importance of taxinduced distortions in quality premiums, and the distributive consequences of
those distortions. While the government has already made the decision to
implement an ad valorem tax, the issue of distributional consequences of
diﬀerent types of wine taxes will surely arise again. Hence, it is useful to seek
to understand the eﬀects of the recent policy choice, with a view to providing
information that may be helpful in future choices.
The contribution of this paper is more general. The fact that agricultural
commodities are becoming more heterogeneous and output quality is
becoming more important relative to output quantity means that we should
re-think how we conduct policy analysis. Questions about how tax (or other)
policies aﬀect diﬀerent qualities of a commodity diﬀerentially and about how
various speciﬁcations of those policies may aﬀect their price, quantity,
quality, and welfare outcomes are certain to arise in Australia and elsewhere.
This paper contributes to this more general set of questions by its
development of an approach to modelling quality variation, by decomposing
policy responses into scale and substitution eﬀects about which we may have
some intuition (e.g., their directions and relative sizes), and by identifying key
parameters that are important determinants of quality responses to policy.
Using this framework, we ﬁnd that: (i) there are important diﬀerences
in quality implications between ad valorem and per unit taxes, (ii) even

ad valorem taxes have quality implications once we allow for fairly general
representations of consumer preferences for goods like wine, and (iii) in the
case of Australian wine taxes, it is likely that the quality eﬀects are large and
the distributional implications are serious.
2. Previous models of quality responses to policies
Perhaps the best-known example of quality responses is the Alchian and
Allen theorem, or why we ‘ship out the good apples’ (Borcherding and
Silberberg 1978). The theorem postulates the eﬀects of transportation costs
on the relative consumption of high-quality and low-quality goods. The
original example given by Alchian and Allen (1964) concerned ‘good’ and
lower-priced ‘bad’ grapes, both grown in California. They noted that the cost
of transporting grapes to, say, New York is the same for all shipments of
grapes, regardless of their quality. From an individual consumer’s perspec
tive, prices are ﬁxed so that the price of each quality of grapes increases by
the amount of the transportation costs (per unit) for consumers in New
York. Thus, good grapes become relatively cheaper for a consumer in New
York, and hence, a New Yorker will consume a larger proportion of good
grapes relative to a person in California who has identical preferences. While
Alchian-Allen eﬀects are usually discussed in the context of transportation
costs, the hypothesised increase in the consumption share of high-quality
goods could occur as a result of many other types of per-unit costs
(as discussed by Umbeck 1980). The primary criteria for a per-unit cost to
generate the Alchian-Allen result are that whatever gives rise to the cost does
not change the good itself, and that it does not have any inherent economic
value in and of itself – i.e., the cost acts just like a per-unit tax.
The reasoning behind the Alchian-Allen eﬀect is that changes in relative
prices drive changes in relative consumption. While intuitive, the eﬀect is
theoretically unambiguous only in a two-good world with no income eﬀects
(Gould and Segall 1969). Borcherding and Silberberg (1978) argued that
while it is possible for the Alchian-Allen theorem to be negated with the
introduction of a third good, unless the high- and low-quality products have
very diﬀerent consumption relationships with the third good, the standard
Alchian-Allen result will hold. Notably, while most of the work in this area
has focused on the eﬀects on consumer choices, a similar analysis of a proﬁt
maximising ﬁrm would generate the same prediction (an increase in average
quality when a per unit cost is incurred). Each of these studies focused on the
behaviour of an individual consumer (or producer) for whom prices are
exogenous, such that the economic agent of interest absorbs the entire
per unit cost. At the market level, however, such costs are shared by
consumers and producers. While Alchian-Allen eﬀects are often observed in

market-level behaviour (Bertonazzi et al. 1993), previous work has not
shown the theoretical conditions under which such eﬀects would be found at
the market level.
Barzel (1976) used a diﬀerent theoretical framework to analyse the problem
at the market level in his alternative approach to taxation. The basis of his
approach is that every commodity is more or less a bundle of characteristics,
similar to Lancaster’s (1966) ‘new’ approach to consumer theory. Barzel (1976)
noted that an ad valorem tax applies to a commodity’s entire value, so it taxes
all of the commodity’s characteristics. In contrast, if a per unit tax is imposed
the tax statute will use a subset of characteristics to deﬁne the commodity,
assuming that an exhaustive description is either impossible or very costly. As a
result, the per unit tax actually taxes only those characteristics used to deﬁne the
commodity. Barzel (1976) showed that a predictable outcome is that the
quantity of the deﬁning characteristics (speciﬁed in the tax statute) will decrease
in response to a per unit tax, and the additional characteristics, which are not
subject to the tax because they are not speciﬁed in the statute, will increase on a
per unit basis – an increase in quality.
The work by Barzel (1976) provides valuable insight into quality responses
at the market level. However, an explicit representation of product
characteristics requires some speciﬁcation of how the characteristics are
combined to make units of the commodity. Work inspired by Barzel’s (1976)
alternative approach to taxation demonstrated the importance of this
speciﬁcation: changes in how characteristics were bundled could even reverse
the quality eﬀects that Barzel (1976) found.1 Of particular importance is the
degree of substitutability between quantity and quality, which is usually
implicit in the particular functional form for the hedonic price function in
such studies. Barzel’s (1976) speciﬁcation implied an elasticity of substitution
between quantity and quality equal to one, whereas Kay and Keen (1987)
implicitly speciﬁed no substitutability between quantity and quality, and
found the converse eﬀect.
Hedonic models have been used widely to represent and measure the price
premiums paid for particular quality attributes of a range of goods, including
wine.2 These studies have given us an idea of the relative magnitudes of
premiums for various quality attributes, and the role labelling or reputation
plays in determining price. However, hedonic models have a number of
limitations in relation to the analysis of the market-level price, quantity, and
1
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quality impacts of policies. Hanemann (1982) pointed out that the need to
specify a functional form for the hedonic price function was a drawback to
using these models for applied demand analysis. In addition, the speciﬁcation
of the hedonic price function determines the ﬁndings regarding policy
outcomes, which imposes a serious limitation on the usefulness of hedonic
models in studies of the eﬀects of policies. Further, incorporating policy
instruments is diﬃcult, as shown in Rosen (1974), where a number of
simplifying assumptions had to be imposed to derive analytical results.
In the hedonic approach, quality of commodities changes continuously,
with continuous changes in their characteristics. In this paper, we model
discrete quality variation; diﬀerent qualities are represented as distinct goods.
It remains necessary to aggregate across qualities within the good being
modelled, and to treat them as homogeneous. This approach is similar to the
studies of the Alchian-Allen eﬀect in that it treats diﬀerent qualities of a
commodity as distinct goods, and allows for conventional multi-market
modelling approaches to be applied. This approach avoids the need to make
assumptions about how characteristics are bundled into goods, and it has the
further virtue that the speciﬁc assumptions that are imposed, such as the
number of qualities included and the separability assumptions, are fairly
transparent.
3. A multi-market approach to modelling quality
The eﬀects of taxes in a closed economy are modelled by specifying a
multi-market equilibrium displacement model, as used, for example, by
Buse (1958), Muth (1964), Perrin (1980), Alston (1986, 1991), Piggott
(1992), and Alston et al. (1995). The commodity of interest is assumed to
be available in two qualities, low and high, with some substitution between
the two qualities, in both demand and supply. Changes in the distribution
of consumption and production between low and high qualities are
interpreted as changes in the average quality of the general commodity
type. In this section we present the two-commodity model, which we use to
derive theoretical results showing the eﬀects of ad valorem and per unit
taxes on average quality and quality premiums. In section 4 we present
results from a numerical simulation using a three-commodity extension of
the model (described in the appendix) applied to the Australian wine
industry.
3.1 Structure of the model and the general solution for two qualities
Because the two qualities are related in consumption and production, the
quantity demanded and supplied of each quality depends on its own price

and the price of the other quality. Other demand and supply shifters, such as
income, demographic variables, and production technology, are treated as
ﬁxed in the analysis, and are therefore not included as arguments. The
demand and supply relationships can be written in general form as:


D
CL ¼ CL PD
ð1Þ
L ; PH
D
CH ¼ CH ðPD
L ; PH Þ

ð2Þ

QL ¼ QL ðPSL ; PSH Þ

ð3Þ

QH ¼

QH ðPSL ; PSH Þ;

ð4Þ

where C denotes quantities consumed, Q denotes quantities produced, and
P denotes prices. Subscripts L and H denote quantities and prices in the lowand high-quality markets, and superscripts D and S denote prices along the
demand and supply curves, respectively. The market-clearing conditions are:
CL ¼ QL

ð5Þ

CH ¼ Q H

ð6Þ

PD
L
D
PH

ð7Þ

¼
¼

PLS ð1 þ tL Þ
PSH ð1 þ tH Þ;

ð8Þ

where tL and tH are proportional taxes in the low- and high-quality markets,
and are initially equal to zero. Increasing either ti term creates a wedge
S
between the consumer price PD
i and the producer price Pi in that market.
Totally diﬀerentiating equations (1) through (8) and transforming the
results yields:
D
d ln CL ¼ gLL d ln PD
L þ gLH d ln PH
D
d ln CH ¼ gHL d ln PD
L þ gHH d ln PH

d ln QL ¼
d ln QH ¼

S
LL d ln PSL þ LH d ln PH
HL d ln PSL þ HH d ln PSH

ð9Þ
ð10Þ
ð11Þ
ð12Þ

d ln CL ¼ d ln QL

ð13Þ

d ln CH ¼ d ln QH

ð14Þ

d ln PD
L
D
d ln PH

ð15Þ

¼
¼

d ln PSL þ tL
d ln PSH þ tH ;

ð16Þ

where d ln X  dX=X denotes a proportional change in the variable X. For
instance, d ln QL  dQL =QL is the proportional change in the quantity
produced of the low-quality product. Coeﬃcients on the d ln Pi terms are
elasticities: gij is the elasticity of demand for quality i with respect to the price
of quality j, and ij is the elasticity of supply of quality i with respect to the

price of quality j.3 Equations (9) through (16) implicitly deﬁne the eight endo
genous variables (the proportional changes in quantities demanded and
supplied and the proportional changes in consumer and producer prices in each
of the two markets) as functions of the two exogenous tax rates, tL and tH .
Imposing the market-clearing conditions in equations (13) and (14), the
proportional quantity changes may be represented by the d ln Qi terms alone,
and the remaining six equations may be speciﬁed in matrix notation as:
2
32
3 2 3
d ln QL
1 0 gLL gLH
0
0
0
6 0 1 gHL gHH
76 d ln QH 7 6 0 7
0
0
7 6 7
6
76
7 607
61 0
76 d ln PD
0
0


LL
LH
L
7 6 7;
6
76
ð17Þ
D 7¼ 6
6
60 1
7
0
0
HL HH 76 d ln PH 7 6 0 7
7
6
40 0
1
0
1
0 54 d ln PSL 5 4 tL 5
d ln PSH
tH
0 0
0
1
0
1
or Ay ¼ x. Inverting the coeﬃcient matrix, A, and pre-multiplying both sides
of equation (17) by the inverse, A1 , yields an explicit expression of the
endogenous variables as functions of the elasticities and exogenous tax rates,
i.e., y ¼ A1 x. The solution for the endogenous variables is:
2
3
2
3
dlnQL
gLL ðLL HH LH HL ÞLL ðgLL gHH gLH gHL Þ
6 dlnQ 7
6 g ð    Þ ðg g g g Þ 7
HL LL HH
H7
LH HL 7
6
6 HL LL HH LH HL
6
7
7
6
D
6 dlnPL 7 1 6
7
LL ðHH gHH ÞþHL ðgLH LH Þ
6
7¼ 6
7tL
6 dlnPD 7 D 6
7
g

g

6
7
6
HL LL
LL HL
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6
7
7
6
4 dlnPSL 5
5
4
gLL ðHH gHH ÞþgHL ðgLH LH Þ
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gHL LL gLL HL
3
gLH ðLL HH LH HL ÞLH ðgLL gHH gLH gHL Þ
6 g ð    Þ ðg g g g Þ 7
HH LL HH
LH HL 7
6 HH LL HH LH HL
6
7
6
7
g

g

16
LH HH
HH LH
7tH
þ 6
7
D6
HH ðLL gLL ÞþLH ðgHL HL Þ
7
6
7
4
5
gLH HH gHH LH
2

gHH ðLL gLL ÞþgLH ðgHL HL Þ
ð18Þ
where:
D ¼ ðLL  gLL ÞðHH  gHH Þ  ðgLH  LH ÞðgHL  HL Þ:
3

Equations (15) and (16) are derived by totally diﬀerentiating the market-clearing condition
for the price of each quality and dividing each side of the expression by the consumer price,
S
noting that P D
i ¼ P i ð1 þ t i Þ, dð1 þ t i Þ ¼ dti , and that dt i ¼ ti (because the initial tax rate is
zero).

The sign and size of the proportional change for each endogenous
variable in equation (18) is determined by the signs, and in some cases the
magnitudes, of the supply and demand elasticities, most of which cannot be
determined in a strictly theoretical approach. In addition, it is not clear
how to link these general results from this two-market speciﬁcation of a
diﬀerentiated good with those from a single-market representation of an
homogeneous good. This link is made by assuming that the low- and highquality goods comprise a weakly separable group, and that all other goods
comprise another weakly separable group and may be aggregated into a
composite commodity.
3.2 Elasticity decompositions under the assumption of weak separability
A group of goods is weakly separable if the marginal rates of substitution
among commodities in that group are independent of the individual prices
and quantities of goods not in the group. Imposing this assumption allows
for the expression of the elasticities of demand and supply for low- and highquality varieties as functions of fundamental demand and supply parameters.
This approach is often associated with Armington (1969), because he used a
special case of the weak separability assumption in his model of demand for
goods distinguished by their country of origin. Muth (1966) provided an
earlier justiﬁcation for invoking the assumption, using a model of household
production.
If two groups of goods are weakly separable and if the price indexes
used for the two groups of commodities are invariant to income, then the
consumer’s budgeting process may be represented in two stages. In the
ﬁrst stage, total expenditure is allocated between the two groups,
depending on the group price indexes. In the second stage, the expenditure
for each group is allocated among the individual commodities in that
group. Many of the results derived below are discussed in terms of the
ﬁrst- and second-stage eﬀects of price changes, although the suﬃcient
conditions for two-stage budgeting are stronger than those necessary for
the elasticity decompositions used here (see Edgerton 1997 for derivations
and discussion).4
Under the assumption that low- and high-quality varieties comprise a
weakly separable group, the elasticities of demand for the individual
4
Carpentier and Guyomard (2001) note that these elasticity decompositions violate sym
metry of the Slutsky substitution matrix, except in the special case of homothetic separability.
While we expect Slutsky symmetry to hold at the level of the individual consumer or ﬁrm, it
need not hold at the market level (nor should we expect it to do so, unless we adhere strictly to
the representative consumer hypothesis).

commodities with respect to the individual prices can be expressed as:
gLL ¼ sL cL g  sH r
ð19Þ
gLH ¼ sH ðcL g þ rÞ
ð20Þ
gHL ¼ sL ðcH g þ rÞ
ð21Þ
gHH ¼ sH cH g  sL r;
ð22Þ
where si is the budget share of quality i (i.e., si ¼ ðPi Qi Þ=PQ, where the
absence of subscripts denotes aggregate price or quantity). First-stage eﬀects
are represented by g, the overall elasticity of demand, or the elasticity of
demand for the aggregate quantity with respect to the aggregate price
ðg < 0Þ. There are two second-stage eﬀects. The second-stage substitution
eﬀect is determined by r, the elasticity of substitution between low- and highquality commodities ðr > 0Þ. The second-stage expansion eﬀects are deter
mined by the ci terms, where ci is the elasticity of demand for quality i with
respect to group expenditure ðci > 0Þ.
Elasticities of supply of the individual commodities with respect to
individual prices can be expressed similarly, as:
LL ¼ sL qL   sH s

ð23Þ

LH ¼ sH ðqL  þ sÞ

ð24Þ

HL ¼ sL ðqH  þ sÞ

ð25Þ

HH ¼ sH qH   sL s;

ð26Þ

where  is the overall elasticity of supply with respect to the group price index,
and represents the ﬁrst-stage eﬀect ð > 0Þ. The second-stage substitution
eﬀect is determined by s, the elasticity of transformation between low-quality
and high-quality varieties in the production process ðs < 0Þ, and qi is an
expansion elasticity, and determines the second-stage expansion eﬀect ðqi > 0Þ.
One advantage of using these decompositions instead of the general
elasticities is that the number of parameters is reduced, and all of the
parameters are of known sign. The eight elasticities are replaced by seven
underlying parameters: g; ; r; s; cH , qH , and sH , noting that sL þ sH ¼ 1,
sL cL þ sH cH ¼ 1, and sL qL þ sH qH ¼ 1. Another important advantage is that
the elasticity decompositions nest two special cases. The ﬁrst is the case of
homothetic separability, used in Armington (1969) trade models.5 In addition
to the assumptions imposed by weak separability, homothetic separability
restricts the elasticities of demand with respect to changes in group
5
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and Kruse (1993), and Sumner et al. (1994) for discussions of the Armington model, speciﬁc
studies, and related econometric issues.

expenditure, and the expansion elasticities of supply, to be equal to one for both
qualities (i.e., cL ¼ cH ¼ qL ¼ qH ¼ 1) such that the quantities consumed of the
diﬀerent qualities change by the same proportion, unless their relative prices
change; similarly for quantities produced. These additional restrictions
eliminate the second-stage expansion eﬀects from the elasticity terms.
The second special case is that of product homogeneity. If, in addition to
eliminating the second-stage expansion eﬀects as in the case of homothetic
separability, the second-stage substitution eﬀects are also eliminated from the
elasticity terms, then only the ﬁrst-stage eﬀects remain. These ﬁrst-stage eﬀects
represent changes in aggregate prices and quantities that would be predicted
from a model of an homogeneous good, without regard for how the composition
of the aggregate might change. Estimated policy outcomes under the assump
tion of product homogeneity are thus found by evaluating the more general
price and quantity eﬀects under the assumptions that the expenditure and
expansion elasticities of the two qualities are equal to one (as in the Armington
case), and that there is no substitution between qualities (i.e., r ¼ s ¼ 0). This
special case will be used as a basis for determining the errors in the estimated
policy eﬀects caused by ignoring quality responses to those policies.
3.3 Price and quantity eﬀects of ad valorem and per unit taxes
After substituting the expressions in equations (19) through (26) into
equation (18), the solution for changes in prices and quantities in response to
the introduction of taxes can be written as:
2
3 2 3
2
3
d ln QL
g
sH rs
6 d ln Q 7 6 g 7
6 s rs 7
H7 6
6
6 L 7
7
7
6
7 6 7
6
D
6 d ln PL 7 6  7 ðsL tL þ sH tH Þ
6 sH s 7 ðtL  tH Þ
7
6
7¼ 6 7
6
þ 6
7
6 d ln PD 7 6  7
g
6
6 sL s 7 r  s
7
H7 6
7
6
7
6
6
7
4 d ln PSL 5 4 g 5
4 sH r 5
d ln PSH

g
sL r
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
first-stage effects
second-stage substitution effects
2
3
sH ½rðqL  qH Þ þ sðcH  cL Þ
6 s ½rðq  q Þ þ sðc  c Þ 7
L
H
H
L 7
6 L
7
6
7 gðsL tL þ sH tH Þ
6
 ssHL ðcH  qH Þ
7
þ6
7 ð  gÞðr  sÞ
6
ðcH  qH Þ
7
6
7
6
5
4
 ssH ðcH  qH Þ
L

ðcH  qH Þ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ
ﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
second-stage expansion effects

ð27Þ

The ﬁrst element of the solution, the ﬁrst-stage eﬀects, shows the price and
quantity eﬀects that would be predicted from a single-market model of an
homogeneous good, in which the tax rate is a value-share weighted sum of
the individual tax rates. The second element of the solution represents the
substitution eﬀects from the second stage of the budgeting process, in which
expenditure is allocated between the diﬀerent qualities of the good. The ﬁrst
two terms combined comprise the solutions under the Armington assumption
of homothetic separability. Finally, the third element in the solution
represents terms that adjust the Armington solutions for the diﬀerent
expansion eﬀects in the low- and high-quality markets. The solution in
equation (27) holds for both ad valorem and per-unit tax policies, but the
speciﬁc results vary because the diﬀerent types of taxes have diﬀerent
implications for the tax-rate parameters, tL and tH . The signs of the ﬁrst- and
second-stage eﬀects (when known) for the ad valorem and per-unit tax
policies are summarised in table 1.
Consider ﬁrst a uniform ad valorem tax policy, where a 100t per cent tax
is imposed on both qualities. In this case, tL ¼ tH ¼ t, which means the
second-stage substitution eﬀects vanish, and the second-stage expansion
eﬀects alone represent the error from assuming product homogeneity. When
the expansion elasticities of the two qualities are equal, the second-stage
expansion eﬀects also vanish, and there is no error from using a model of an
homogeneous good to estimate the eﬀects of an ad valorem tax. However,
when the two qualities comprise a weakly separable but not a homothet
ically separable group, the second-stage expansion eﬀects adjust the
predicted eﬀects from the single-market model. The signs of the secondstage expansion eﬀects depend on the relative sizes of the expansion
elasticities, which are not known for this general case. However, for typical
goods, such as wine, it seems likely that the expenditure elasticity of demand
Table 1 Directions of eﬀects on endogenous variables from ad valorem and per-unit taxes
Second-stage
substitution eﬀects
Variable
QL
QH
PD
L
PD
H
P SL
P SH

Second-stage expansion
eﬀects (both policies)

First-stage
eﬀects
(both policies)

Ad valorem
tax

Per-unit
tax

cH > qH

cH < qH



þ
þ



0
0
0
0
0
0


þ
þ


þ

?
?
þ

þ


?
?

þ

þ

Note: ‘?’ indicates that the direction of the eﬀect is unknown.

for the high-quality variety will be larger than that of the low-quality
variety, so that cH > 1 and cL < 1 (a higher income elasticity of demand for
higher quality), while the relationship on the supply side seems likely to be
the converse, qH < 1 and qL > 1 (it is relatively diﬃcult to expand
production of higher quality). These conditions imply that cH > qH , which
implies that the price eﬀects will be more pronounced in the market where
the expansion eﬀect is smaller: the expansion eﬀects accentuate the
consumer price increase for the low-quality good and the producer price
decrease for the high-quality good.
Next, consider the eﬀects of a uniform tax of T per unit. The initial
quality-speciﬁc prices are used to convert the tax to proportional terms, and
the two tax rates are speciﬁed as tL ¼ T =P L and tH ¼ T =P H , where P L
S
and P H are the initial prices, and P D
i ¼ P i at the initial equilibrium,
so the superscripts may be dropped. The algebra for the eﬀects of this
tax policy can be condensed somewhat by deﬁning P as the average unit
value of the total quantity at the initial equilibrium, i.e., P ¼ ðP L QL þ
P H QH Þ=ðQL þ QH Þ, which implies that sL tL þ sH tH ¼ T =P and tL  tH ¼
ðP H  P L ÞT =P L P H . Further, prices of individual qualities relative to the
average unit value are deﬁned as P~i ¼ P i =P . Using these deﬁnitions, the
eﬀects of the per-unit tax policy can be written as:
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second-stage expansion effects
The ﬁrst-stage eﬀects in equation (28) are equivalent to the changes in
prices and quantities that would be estimated using a single-market model
for a per-unit tax of T and an initial price of P . In contrast to the ad valorem

tax, the second-stage substitution eﬀects are no longer equal to zero, because
the proportional tax rates diﬀer. By deﬁnition, the price of the high-quality
good is larger than that of the low-quality good, and all of the other elements
in the second set of terms are of known sign. As shown in the third column
of table 1, the second-stage substitution eﬀects mean that the quantity
reduction in the low-quality market is greater and the quantity reduction in
the high-quality market is smaller than those predicted in a single-market
model of a per unit tax applied to an homogeneous good. Finally, the terms
representing the second-stage expansion eﬀect take the same signs as they did
for the ad valorem tax, for the same relative parameter values.
3.4 Quality eﬀects of ad valorem and per unit tax policies
The use of a single-market model to represent an aggregate of various
qualities implicitly assumes that the policy impacts will be the same for all
qualities, so that the average quality of the aggregate is constant. Deﬁning
average quality as QH =QL , the proportional change in average quality
resulting from the tax policy is measured as the diﬀerence between the
proportional quantity changes, d ln QH  d ln QL .6 Similarly, consumer and
producer price premiums for high quality can be expressed as the ratio of the
price of the high-quality product to the price of the low-quality product (i.e.,
D
S
S
PD
H =P L and P H =P L , respectively). Thus, the proportional changes in the price
premiums will equal the diﬀerence between the proportional price changes
for the individual goods, d ln P iH  d ln P iL , for i ¼ D; S. The degree to which
these measures diﬀer from zero is a further indication of the errors caused by
assuming product homogeneity.
The proportional changes in average quality and the price premiums for
either tax policy are given by:
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Average quality could be deﬁned in a number of ways. The deﬁnition used here is
particularly convenient.

The directions and magnitudes of each of these changes hinge on the secondstage eﬀects in equation (27). The ﬁrst terms in equations (29) through (31)
measure the diﬀerences between the substitution eﬀects in the low- and highquality markets, and the second terms measure the diﬀerences between the
expansion eﬀects in the two markets.
For a uniform ad valorem tax, there are no substitution eﬀects in either
market, so the ﬁrst terms in equations (29) through (31) are eliminated.
When the Armington assumptions are appropriate, the second terms equal
zero as well; average quality and both the consumer and the producer
quality premiums remain constant, as would be implicitly predicted from a
single-market model of an homogeneous product. However, these changes
will not equal zero under the assumption of (nonhomothetic) weak
separability, even for the case of an uniform ad valorem tax. This is a
somewhat unexpected result: even an ad valorem tax can distort relative
prices and the incentives to produce and consume quality when the more
general (and more realistic) supply and demand relationships are incorpor
ated in the analysis. These quality eﬀects are summarised in the upper panel
of table 2.
For the case of a weakly separable group of goods, when cH > qH (where
the expansion eﬀects for the higher-quality good on the demand side exceed
those on the supply side), the quality premiums for consumers and producers
both decrease as a result of the tax policy (column three of table 2). This
would create an incentive for consumers to increase the quality of their
consumption, and for producers to decrease the quality of their production.
The direction of the eﬀect on average quality, which must be the same for
both consumers and producers, is indeterminant. It depends on the relative
expansion eﬀects between the low- and high-quality commodities for
Table 2 Quality eﬀects of ad valorem and per-unit taxes
Weak separability
Quality variable

Homogeneous
product

Homothetic
separability

cH > qH

cH < qH

QH =QL
D
PD
H =P L
S
P H =P SL

0
0
0

Ad valorem tax
0
0
0

?



?
+
+

QH =QL
D
PD
H =P L
S
P H =P SL

0
0
0

Per-unit tax
+

+

?

?

?
?
++

Note: ‘‘++’’ (‘‘’’) indicates a larger increase (decrease) relative to ‘‘+’’ (‘‘’’), ‘?’ indicates that the
direction of the eﬀect is unknown.

consumers and for producers, and on the relative diﬀerences in the expansion
eﬀects between consumers and producers for each quality.
For a per-unit tax, the quality eﬀects are:
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The directions of these quality eﬀects are shown in the lower panel of table 2.
Unlike the ad valorem tax, under the assumption of homothetic separability, a
per-unit tax has unambiguous quality eﬀects unless both r and s are equal to
zero. As long as there are some substitution possibilities in both consumption
and production, and r and s take on their normal signs (i.e., r > 0, s < 0), the
proportional quantity reduction in the high-quality market will be smaller than
that in the low-quality market, and average quality will increase as a result of
the tax. The consumer’s quality premium decreases, and the producer’s quality
premium increases. These eﬀects are intuitive. If average quality increases as a
result of the tax, consumers require an incentive to consume higher quality: a
lower quality premium. Similarly, producers require an incentive to produce
higher quality: a higher quality premium.
The results for the case of homothetic separability oﬀer proof of the AlchianAllen theorem at the market level. However, this ‘proof’ must be qualiﬁed, as it
relies on the assumption of homothetic separability; results are ambiguous in a
more general setting. As noted by Gould and Segall (1969) and Borcherding
and Silberberg (1978) for the individual consumer problem, the Alchian-Allen
eﬀect is unambiguous only in a two-good world with no income eﬀects.
Similarly, at the market level, the assumption of homotheticity in eﬀect restricts
the roles that income and third goods can play, as they enter the conditional
demand functions through the expenditure term. The quality eﬀects in the
more-general setting, when the assumption of homotheticity is relaxed, are
shown in the third column of table 2 for the case where cH > qH , and in the
fourth column for the less-likely case where cH < qH . Under the more-general
assumption of (nonhomothetic) weak separability, only one of the three quality
eﬀects can be determined unambiguously.
4. Taxes on Australian wine
Prior to June 2000, Australian wine was subject to a 41 per cent wholesale
tax. With the introduction of the 10 per cent GST, the previous tax policy

was also reformed such that the combined set of changes would be taxrevenue neutral. There was some debate about whether the new wholesale tax
should be speciﬁed on a per-unit or ad valorem basis (Wittwer and Anderson
1998 and 2002; Berger and Anderson 1999). In discussions of the relative
merits of the diﬀerent tax policies, the eﬀects on producers and consumers of
diﬀerent qualities of wine were often mentioned. Alchian-Allen type
arguments were made, suggesting that costs from a per-unit tax would be
relatively higher for producers and consumers of low-quality wine, and thus
would favour high-quality producers (Berger and Anderson 1999). The
analysis presented here serves to evaluate whether such statements, based on
intuition about individual consumer and producer optimisation, are true at
the market level, and to quantify the extent to which price, quantity, and
welfare impacts diﬀer among the markets for lower-quality (cask) and
premium wines.
In our model of the market for Australian wine, wine is aggregated into
three groups: cask, premium white, and premium red.7 This representation
aggregates wine that is certainly heterogeneous into each of the three
composites, but this aggregation is justiﬁed on at least three grounds. First, it
is more accurate than treating all wine as a single aggregate. Second, it allows
us to check our intuition about how the responses to taxes may diﬀer among
a few classes of wine, whereas including more detail would tend to make the
results diﬃcult to decipher. Third, it is a level of disaggregation for which
price and quantity data are available.
The particular representation of the wine market is stylized, and it
abstracts from a number of details that might be important if the analysis
were to be used for policy prescription rather than illustration. The model
does not distinguish between wholesale and retail markets for wine, which
would be important for purposes of prescribing policy (i.e., ﬁnding the
revenue-neutral pre- and post-GST tax rates, as done by Wittwer and
Anderson 1998 and 2002) because pre-2000 taxes were all imposed at the
wholesale level, while the new GST is a retail tax. The wholesale-retail
distinction could be incorporated by specifying a mark-up pricing rule, but
that would be an unhelpful complication for the present purpose. A further
simpliﬁcation in the model is that it does not explicitly incorporate
international trade. Export demand is included implicitly by specifying the
total demand for Australian wine in each quality category. A more realistic
model might have diﬀerential tax rates applied to exports versus domestic
consumption. This would mean that a tax policy change might give rise to
7

How to disaggregate Australian wine is arbitrary, given the absence of any empirical
evidence for particular separability assumptions. Ultimately, the decision is governed by the
availability of data. We have used the same categories as Wittwer and Anderson (2001), from
whom we obtained the data.

diﬀerences in the mixes of quality produced, consumed, and traded. While
foreign wine imported into Australia is omitted, imported wine accounts for
a small share of wine consumed domestically, and any errors caused by
omitting wine imports are expected to be small.
The general structure of the three-quality model is similar to that of the
two-quality model described in section 3.1, and the full details are provided in
the appendix. Demand and supply of each quality depend on all of the
quality-speciﬁc prices. Taxes are represented as diﬀerences between consumer
and producer prices, and the proportional changes in the quality-speciﬁc
prices and quantities are expressed as functions of the exogenous, qualityspeciﬁc tax rates. As for the two-quality case, an assumption of weak
separability is imposed to simplify the results. In particular, cask and
premium wine are assumed to comprise a weakly separable group, and then
red and white premium wines are assumed to be weakly separable from cask
wine. This separability structure adds an additional stage to the budgeting
process, in which the expenditure on production and consumption of
premium wine is allocated between red and white. In this additional stage,
total response to price changes includes both substitution and expansion
eﬀects, much like the second-stage eﬀects described earlier. The model is
structured such that the two-quality model is a special case in which there are
no substitution possibilities between red and white premium wines, and their
expansion eﬀects are equal. The extension of the model from two to three
qualities illustrates how this type of approach to modelling quality can be
applied to cases with more than three qualities, or with diﬀerent separability
structures.
4.1 Price, quantity, and quality eﬀects of alternative wine taxes
The model of the three qualities of wine described earlier (and in the
appendix) is speciﬁed using price and quantity data for 1999, shown in
table 3. While several studies of the demand for wine in diﬀerent countries
have been conducted (see Larivière et al. 2000 for a review), very few have
focused on demand for Australian wine. Abdalla and Duﬀus (1988)
estimated the demand for cask and premium wines, and found own-price
elasticities of 1:50 and 0:02, respectively (information obtained from
Shepherd, O’Donnell and Abdalla 1999). Clements and Johnson (1983)
estimated the aggregate demand for wine, and found an own-price elasticity
of 0:43. Wittwer and Anderson (2002) note, however, that the parameter
estimates of these studies may no longer apply, because of the subsequent
expansion of the industry, particularly in the production and consumption of
higher-quality wines. Estimates of supply elasticities are even more rare in
the literature.

Table 3 Prices and quantities of Australian wine, 1999
Type of wine

Retail price

Quantitya

Value share

Cask
Premiumb
White
Red

A$ per litre
3.71
12.28
11.46
13.11

millions of litres
270.6
294.3
148.2
146.1

proportion
0.22
0.78
0.37 (0.47 of premium)
0.41 (0.53 of premium)

Source: Wittwer and Anderson (2001).
Notes: a Quantities refer to quantities of Australian wine consumed in 1999, and include domestic and
foreign consumption.
b
Price for the premium aggregate is deﬁned as the quantity-share weighted sum of the prices for premium
white and red wines. Quantity for the premium aggregate is deﬁned as the simple sum of the quantities of
premium white and red.

The approach taken here is a common one in studies of commodity
markets and policies. A model is speciﬁed and parameterised based on
consumption, production, and prices in a particular year (or a represen
tative year), combined with a set of elasticities. In most cases, few if any of
the elasticities are estimated directly within a policy study, and usually it is
not possible (or sensible) simply to take elasticities from the literature.
Instead, relevant elasticities are ‘guestimated’ using a combination of
results in the literature, economic theory, and intuition. The problem of
limited availability of speciﬁc elasticity estimates for parameterising a
policy model becomes more serious as we move in the direction of using
less aggregative models. That this is so can be seen in the studies by
Wittwer and Anderson (1998, 2001 and 2002) that model the Australian
wine market.8 While these studies use the same three categories of wine,
our model is structured diﬀerently such that the speciﬁc elasticities refer to
diﬀerent concepts (e.g., Hicksian versus Marshallian demand elasticities,
domestic versus total demand, and possibly diﬀerent lengths of run); hence,
the elasticities are not directly comparable. Even though they are not
directly comparable without signiﬁcant eﬀort, we believe that the set of
elasticities used here is broadly consistent with that used by Wittwer and
Anderson (1998, 2001 and 2002), and neither set is clearly better or worse
than the other.9
Some economists appear to believe that econometrically estimated
elasticities are intrinsically more accurate and otherwise superior to ‘calib
rated’ or ‘guestimated’ elasticities of the sort typically used in applied policy
8
9

See also Zhao, Anderson and Wittwer (2002).

Wittwer and Anderson (1998, 2001 and 2002) also had to use a combination of economic
theory and their own intuition to derive the elasticities they used.

analysis, but econometric estimates have their own set of deﬁciencies – such
as implausible magnitudes, wrong signs, and inconsistencies with theory. A
virtue of the introspective approach to estimating elasticities is that at least
these drawbacks can be avoided. In his discussion of ways in which noise
aﬀects markets and colors our investigations of them, Fischer Black (1986)
said ‘Sometimes I wonder if we can draw any conclusions at all from the
results of regression studies … [The] slopes of demand and supply curves are
so hard to estimate that they are essentially unobservable. Introspection
seems as good a method as any in trying to estimate them’ (pp. 535–536).
Even if we wished to estimate the supply and demand elasticities economet
rically, suﬃcient data are simply not available for the quality categories of
interest. We have to rely on a few estimates from the literature and
introspection.
While there is little empirical evidence to support any particular elasticity
values, we do have some intuition about the relative values of certain
parameters; and once some parameter values are speciﬁed, others are
determined by theoretical restrictions. The values used for the underlying
supply and demand parameters are shown in table 4, and the own- and crossprice elasticities of demand and supply implied by the underlying parameter
values and the value shares are shown in table 5. Demand is assumed to be
more elastic than supply, in terms of the overall elasticities. The remaining
parameter values were chosen to ensure that the diﬀerent qualities of wine
were substitutes in demand and in supply, while imposing the adding-up
conditions on the expansion elasticities. The elasticity of substitution in
demand between cask and premium wines and that between red and white
premium wines were both set equal to 3. On the supply side, cask and

Table 4 Parameter values used for model of Australian wine taxes
Demand parameters
Eﬀect represented by parameter

Supply parameters

Symbol

Value

Symbol

Value

Stage 1 eﬀects
Overall elasticity

g

1:5



1.0

Stage 2 eﬀects
Substitution eﬀect
Scale eﬀect – cask
Scale eﬀect – premium

r
cL
cH

3.0
0.3
1.2

s
qL
qH

2:0
1.7
0.8

Stage 3 eﬀects
Substitution eﬀect
Scale eﬀect – white premium
Scale eﬀect – red premium

rWR
cW
cR

3.0
0.8
1.2

sWR
qW
qR

1:5
1.0
1.0

Table 5 Demand and supply elasticities used in the model of Australian wine
Elasticity with respect to the price of:
Cask

Premium white

Premium red

Elasticity of demand for:
Cask
Premium white
Premium red

2:44
0.20
0.31

0.95
2:34
0.25

1.07
0.74
2:72

Elasticity of supply of:
Cask
Premium white
Premium red

1.94
0:26
0:26

0:10
1.29
0:21

0:12
0:23
1.27

premium wines were assumed to be more easily transformed from one to the
other (by altering production practices) than are red and white premium
wines (because such a transformation would require grafting or replanting a
vineyard).
Elasticities of demand with respect to expenditure are assumed to be larger
for higher-priced categories of wine. The expenditure elasticity of premium
wine was set equal to 1.2, and the cask-wine elasticity was recovered using the
adding-up condition: sL cL þ sH cH ¼ 1. Similarly, the elasticity of demand for
premium red wine with respect to expenditure on premium wine was set equal
to 1.2, and the expenditure elasticity for premium white wine was recovered
using a similarly deﬁned adding-up condition. On the supply side, expansion
of high-quality wine was assumed to be less elastic (owing to more limiting
specialised factors, such as land and management), and so the expansion
elasticity for cask wine is larger than that of premium wine. The expansion
elasticity of premium wine was set equal to 0.8, and the corresponding
elasticity for cask wines was recovered using the adding-up condition. The
expansion elasticities of supply are assumed to be equal to one for both red
and white premium wines.
The own- and cross-price elasticities derived from these values, shown in
table 5, have signs (and magnitudes) that are consistent with our intuition.
Own-price elasticities of demand are all negative, and are larger for the
premium wines then for cask wines. Cross-price elasticities are all positive,
indicating that the wines are gross substitutes, and demand for cask wine is
more responsive to changes in the prices of premium wines than the converse.
Own-price elasticities of supply are all positive, and larger for cask wine than
for premium wines. Cross-price elasticities of supply are all negative,
indicating that the wines are substitutes. The analytical solution in the
appendix can be used to see how the results might diﬀer for a diﬀerent set of
parameter values.

Table 6 Price and quantity eﬀects of ad valorem and per litre wine taxes, decomposed into
ﬁrst-, second-, and third-stage eﬀects
Second-stage eﬀects
Variable

First-stage
eﬀect

Subst.

Expan.

Third-stage eﬀects
Subst.

Expan.

Total
eﬀect

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.43
0:38
0.00
0.29
0:26
0.00
0.29
0:26

6:86
5:33
6:14
5.73
3.81
3.26
4:27
6:19
6:74

0.00
0:53
0.47
0.00
0.18
0:16
0.00
0:35
0.31

0.00
0.15
0:13
0.00
0.10
0:09
0.00
0.10
0:09

23:78
2:34
1:61
11.77
2.71
2.19
12:83
5:25
4:77

percentage change
10 per cent Ad Valorem Tax
QL
6:00
6:00
QW
6:00
QR
4.00
PD
L
PD
4.00
W
PD
4.00
R
P SL
6:00
P SW
6:00
P SR
6:00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0:86
0.24
0.24
1.73
0:48
0:48
1.73
0:48
0:48
percentage change

$0.91 Per Litre Tax
QL
6:70
6:70
QW
6:70
QR
PD
4.46
L
4.46
PD
W
PD
4.46
R
P SL
6:70
P SW
6:70
P SR
6:70

16:12
4.48
4.48
5.37
1:49
1:49
8:06
2.24
2.24

0:96
0.27
0.27
1.93
0:54
0:54
1.93
0:54
0:54

The upper panel of table 6 shows the percentage change in the quantity,
consumer price, and producer price of each quality of wine for a 10 per cent
ad valorem tax. The values of the ﬁrst-, second-, and third-stage eﬀects are
shown, as well as the net eﬀects (in the last column). It is clear that, even
when there are no substitution eﬀects, the expansion eﬀects cause the changes
in price and quantity to diﬀer among the various qualities. Using a model of
an homogeneous good as an approximation, or relying on intuition from
individual consumer or producer problems, one would expect each of the
price and quantity eﬀects to be the same for all three qualities, which is
clearly not the case.
Eﬀects of a per-litre tax that would generate the same tax revenue as the
10 per cent ad valorem tax are shown in the lower panel of table 6. The tax of
$0.91 per litre was found by equating tax revenue from the 10 per cent
ad valorem tax to that of the per-litre tax, using the model of three qualities
of wine. The diﬀerences among the eﬀects in the three markets are revealed
in the last column, and are much more pronounced than they were for the

Table 7 Quality eﬀects of ad valorem and per litre wine taxes
Quality measurea

10 per cent ad valorem

$0.91 per litre

percentage change
Average quality
White
Red

1.54
0.72

21.44
22.17

Consumer quality premium
White
Red

1:92
2:46

9:05
9:57

Producer quality premium
White
Red

1:92
2:46

7.58
8.06

a

Each quality eﬀect is calculated assuming that proportional changes in quantities and prices are equal for
white and red cask wines.

ad valorem tax. The proportional decrease in the quantity of cask wine is
roughly ten times those of the premium wines. Diﬀerences in the propor
tional changes in consumer and producer prices are also large, with the
consumer price of cask wine increasing by about 12 per cent, and the
consumer prices of white and red premium wines increasing by approxi
mately 2 and 3 per cent, respectively. The diﬀerences in the price and quantity
outcomes among the three markets are driven by the second- and third-stage
eﬀects, particularly the second-stage substitution eﬀects.
The quality eﬀects of the two taxes are summarised in table 7, which shows
the percentage change in average quality and the consumer and producer
quality premiums, for white and red wines. These quality eﬀects are
calculated assuming that proportional eﬀects on white and red cask wines
are equal, and using expressions similar to equations (29) through (34). For
the ad valorem tax, average qualities of white and red wines increase
somewhat, but the increases in average quality are much more pronounced
for the revenue-neutral per-unit tax (both increasing by over 20 per cent). For
both tax policies and both red and white wines, consumer quality premiums
decrease, although these decreases are larger for the per-unit tax policy.
Finally, producer quality premiums for both red and white wines decrease for
the ad valorem tax, but increase for the per unit tax.
Table 8 shows the tax revenue collected in each market from each tax
policy, in millions of dollars and as a percentage of the total tax revenue
collected. For the ad valorem tax, the tax burden is relatively higher in the
premium wine markets than in the cask-wine market, with only 22 per cent
of the tax revenue collected on cask wine sales. In contrast, for the per-litre
tax, the tax burden is relatively higher in the cask-wine market, with

Table 8 Tax revenue collected from ad valorem and per-litre wine taxes
10 per cent ad valorem tax

$0.91 per-litre tax

$ million

share of tax revenue
(per cent)

$ million

share of tax
revenue (per cent)

Cask
White
Red

98.86
166.91
185.64

21.90
36.98
41.12

188.19
132.06
131.16

41.69
29.26
29.06

Total

451.41

100.00

451.41

100.00

Market

42 per cent of the tax revenue collected. Thus, although the two tax policies
generate the same amount of tax revenue, the incidence of the costs diﬀers
substantially between the two policies.
5. Concluding remarks
While the assumption of product homogeneity is convenient, it is important
to recognise that it may not always be appropriate. The analytical results
presented here indicate that tax policies may induce distortions in the
quality mix of units sold and in quality premiums. Under the assumption of
homothetic separability, eﬀects of taxes are very similar to the AlchianAllen eﬀects discussed in the literature in the context of individual
consumer behaviour: an ad valorem tax leaves average quality and quality
premiums unchanged, while a per unit tax increases average quality,
decreases the consumer quality premium, and increases the producer quality
premium.
In contrast, when we allow for more general demand and supply
conditions, market-level eﬀects of taxes are not entirely consistent with our
expectations, based on intuition about individual behaviour from Alchian
and Allen (1964). When the qualities of interest comprise a (nonhomothetic)
weakly separable group, even an ad valorem tax can distort quality. Because
the quality eﬀects are second-order eﬀects, they will not always be
important. When the quality eﬀects are small, a single-market model for
an aggregate good may reasonably approximate the actual policy eﬀects in
the markets for heterogeneous products. However, the larger are those
quality eﬀects, the less accurate will be the results from a model of an
homogeneous good. Relatively large quality eﬀects mean that the errors
from using an model of an homogeneous good to estimate policy impacts
would be large as well.
Results from the analytical model demonstrate which parameters are
important in determining the direction and magnitude of the errors caused by

ignoring quality variation. In general, the errors from assuming product
homogeneity increase as the degree of substitutability between qualities (in
consumption or production) increases, as the diﬀerence in prices of high and
low qualities increases, and as the size of the tax increases. Diﬀerences in the
expansion eﬀects between qualities also inﬂuence the errors from incorrectly
assuming product homogeneity. An empirical analysis using price and
quantity data and reasonable parameter values to represent the Australian
wine market indicated that per unit taxes would have substantial eﬀects on
average quality and quality premiums, which diﬀered signiﬁcantly from those
of ad valorem taxes. Hence, ad valorem and per unit tax policies that are
equivalent in terms of tax revenue collected have very diﬀerent implications
for how the costs of the policies are distributed among producers and
consumers of diﬀerent qualities.
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Appendix
A three-quality model of the Australian wine market
The three-quality model is structured as above for two qualities, where
demand for and supply of each quality of wine are functions of the prices of
all three qualities, or:
D
D
Ci ¼ Ci ðPD
ð35Þ
L ; P W ; PR Þ
S
Qi ¼ Qi ðPSL ; PSW ; PR
Þ;

ð36Þ

for i ¼ L; W; and R, where subscript L refers to cask wine (including both
white and red), and subscripts W and R denote premium white and premium
red wines, respectively. Equilibrium conditions are speciﬁed for each of the
three markets, as:
Ci ¼ Qi
S
PD
i ¼ Pi ð1 þ ti Þ:

ð37Þ
ð38Þ

These supply and demand functions and equilibrium conditions can be
totally diﬀerentiated and transformed to logarithmic diﬀerential form, so
that the nine endogenous variables (quantity, consumer price, and producer

price for each of the three qualities) are implicitly deﬁned as functions of
parameters and the three tax rates. In matrix notation:
2
32
3 2 3
d ln QL
1 0 0 gLL gLW gLR
0
0
0
0
6 0 1 0 gWL gWW gWR
76 d ln QW 7 6 0 7
0
0
0
6
76
7 6 7
6 0 0 1 gRL gRW gRR
6
7 6 7
0
0
0 7
6
76 d ln QDR 7 6 0 7
61 0 0
6
7
6 7
0
0
0
LL LW LR 76 d ln PL 7
6
7 60 7
D 7
60 1 0
7
6
7
0
0
0
WL WW WR 76 d ln PW 7 ¼ 6
6
6 0 7:
D
60 0 1
6
7 6 7
0
0
0
RL RW RR 7
6
76 d ln PRS 7 6 0 7
60 0 0
6
7
7 6 tL 7
d
ln
P
1
0
0
1
0
0 76
L 7
6
6 7
S 5
40 0 0
4
5
4 tW 5
d ln PW
0
1
0
0
1
0
S
d ln PR
tR
0 0 0
0
0
1
0
0
1
ð39Þ
The general solution for the endogenous variables can be found by premultiplying each side of equation (39) by the inverse of the left-hand side
matrix.
Cask and premium wines are assumed to comprise a weakly separable
group and, within that group, red and white premium wines are assumed to
comprise another weakly separable group (i.e., the marginal rate of
substitution between red and white premium wines is independent of the
consumption of cask wine). This additional separability assumption adds a
third stage to the budgeting process, in which expenditure on premium wine is
allocated between red and white wines. Accordingly, the elasticities of demand
and supply for each of the premium wines include third-stage substitution
and expansion eﬀects in addition to the ﬁrst- and second-stage eﬀects.
The elasticities of demand for the diﬀerent qualities of wine with respect to
individual price changes are:
gLL ¼ sL cL g  sH r

ð40Þ

gLj ¼ sj ðcL g þ rÞ

ð41Þ

gjL ¼ sL cj ðcH g þ rÞ

ð42Þ

gij ¼ sðHÞj ½ci ðsH cH g  sL rÞ þ rWR 

for i ¼
6 j

gii ¼ sðHÞi ci ðsH cH g  sL rÞ  ð1  sðHÞi ÞrWR

ð43Þ
ð44Þ

for i, j ¼ W, R, where sðHÞW is the expenditure on white premium wine as a
share of total expenditure on premium wine (i.e., sðHÞW ¼ ðPW QW Þ=ðPH QH Þ),
and sðHÞR is deﬁned similarly. In addition, ci for i ¼ W; R is the elasticity of
demand for the ith wine with respect to expenditure on premium wine, and
rWR > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between white and red premium
wines. All other parameters are deﬁned as in the two-quality case. The

elasticities of supply for the individual qualities with respect to changes in
price are:
LL ¼ sL qL   sH s
ð45Þ
Lj ¼ sj ðqL  þ sÞ
ð46Þ
jL ¼ sL qj ðqH  þ sÞ
ð47Þ
ij ¼ sðHÞj ½qi ðsH qH   sL sÞ þ sWR 

for i 6¼ j

ii ¼ sðHÞi qi ðsH qH   sL sÞ  ð1  sðHÞi ÞsWR

ð48Þ
ð49Þ

for i, j ¼ W, R, where qi represents the third-stage expansion eﬀect in either the
premium white or premium red market, and sWR < 0 is the elasticity of
transformation between white and red premium wines.
The analytical solution to the system of equations (39) obtained using these
elasticity decompositions is given in equation (50). Comparing the two- and
three-quality solutions (i.e., equations (27) and (50)), the nested nature of the
results is revealed. The ﬁrst- and second-stage eﬀects from the two-good
solution are modiﬁed slightly for the three-good case, and third-stage
substitution and expansion eﬀects are added. Notably, there are no thirdstage eﬀects for the quantity and producer and consumer prices of the lowquality good, as the third-stage eﬀects allocate expenditure between white
and red premium wines, just as the second-stage eﬀects allocate expenditure
between cask and premium wines.
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d ln QL
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7 6 7
6
6 d ln QR 7 6 g 7
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